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INTRODUCTION
Private ordering is in vogue in legal scholarship. Nowhere is this
clearer than on the Internet. Legal scholars who study the Internet
talk freely about new forms of governance tailored to the specific
needs of the Net. Only rarely are these "governance" models ones
that involve a significant role for government as classically
envisioned. Some scholars see international law, with its emphasis on
* Copyright 1999 Mark A. Lemley, Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law;
of counsel, Fish & Richardson P.C., Austin, Texas. Effective January 2000, Professor, Boalt
Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
I would like to thank Keith Aoki, Julie Cohen, Dick Craswell, Susan Freiwald, Rose
Hagan, Larry Lessig, David McGowan, Peggy Radin, Arti Rai, Jason Schultz, and Eugene
Volokh for comments on an earlier draft, the participants in the Chicago-Kent Symposium on
the Internet and Legal Theory and law and economics workshops at the Boalt Hall School of
Law, University of California at Berkeley, the Stanford Law School, and the USC Law Center
for helping me to hone these ideas, and Ryan Garcia for research assistance.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
political and moral suasion rather than legal authority, as the
appropriate way to govern what is, after all, an international
phenomenon.' Many others, though, look to contracts as the
preferred model for governing cyberspace. Their visions of private
ordering differ, ranging from the complex adaptive systems favored
by David Johnson and David Post2 to the rather more structured set
1. See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer, Licensing on the Global Information Infrastructure:
Disharmony in Cyberspace, 16 NW. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 224, 246-47 (1995); Sean Selin, Governing
Cyberspace: The Need for an International Solution, 32 GONz. L. REV. 365 (1997); Matthew R.
Burnstein, Note, Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in Transnational Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 75 (1996). David Post offers the Clinton Administration's NII White Paper and
the WIPO Copyright Treaties as examples of this internationalization tendency. See David G.
Post, Governing Cyberspace, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 155, 164 n.24 (1996). While international law
is not really private ordering because it involves the interaction of governments, the way in
which governments interact in international law (at least in peacetime) is generally through
agreement and not coercive authority. See I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for
"Cyberspace", 55 U. Prrr. L. REV. 993, 1022-25 (1994) (treating customary international law as
a form of quasi-private ordering). Cf Robyn Forman Pollack, Creating the Standards of a
Global Community: Regulating Pornography on the Internet-An International Concern, 10
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 467 (1996) (suggesting international self-regulation).
Dan Burk makes the suggestion that international treaties harmonizing trademark law will
help alleviate some of the problems associated with the Net's globalization of trademark
disputes. See Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L.
REV. 695, 731-33 (1998) [hereinafter Burk, Trademark Doctrines]. This is not really an
argument for internationalization as a replacement for sovereign law, since the treaty in
question would simply facilitate the enforcement of national laws. Cf. Dan L. Burk, The Market
for Digital Piracy, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 205, 227-28 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997)
(arguing that the Internet will facilitate international regulatory competition, though not
necessarily with desirable results).
2. See, e.g., David G. Post & David R. Johnson, "Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent":
Towards A New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHt.-KENT
L. REV. 1055 (1998) [hereinafter Johnson & Post, Chaos]; David R. Johnson & David G. Post,
And How Shall the Net Be Governed?: A Meditation on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized,
Emergent Law, in COORDINATING THE INTERNET 62 (Brian Kahin & James H. Keller eds.,
1997) [hereinafter Johnson & Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed?]; David R. Johnson &
David Post, Law and Borders- The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996)
[hereinafter Johnson & Post, Law and Borders]; David R. Johnson & David G. Post, The Rise
of Law on the Global Network, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 1, at 3 [hereinafter
Johnson & Post, Rise of Law]; Post, supra note 1; David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the
Internet: An Essay on Law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 3 <http://
www.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/post.html> [hereinafter Post, Anarchy]. For similar
approaches, see, e.g., Kevin K. Ban, Note, Does the Internet Warrant a Twenty-Seventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution?, 23 J. CORP. L. 521 (1998) (arguing that the
Internet should be established as a separate jurisdiction); Jay Krasovec, Comment, Cyberspace:
The Final Frontier, for Regulation?, 31 AKRON L. REV. 101 (1997); Aron Mefford, Note, Lex
Informatica: Foundations of Law on the Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 211 (1997); cf.
Timothy S. Wu, Note, Cyberspace Sovereignty?- The Internet and the International System, 10
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 647 (1997).
Still other scholars are sympathetic to Johnson and Post's argument that the Internet
makes governmental regulation more difficult, though they do not endorse the idea of the
Internet as a separate jurisdiction. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of
Regulatory Arbitrage, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 1, at 129, 152-54.
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of form contracts suggested by Bob Dunne.3
These models generally rely in the final analysis on a supreme
legal authority; someone must establish the initial property
entitlements and enforce the contracts that govern the Net, after all.4
The property-contract model is perhaps better thought of, then, as
quasi-private ordering. But the common goal of these quasi-private
ordering advocates is to decentralize governance and return control
to the people-at least, the people who write the contracts.5  This
vision of the primacy of contract may be on its way to adoption in
some areas of the law.6 Both Terry Fisher's and Niva Elkin-Koren's
papers in this symposium are reacting to the particular ascendancy of
contract as a substitute for law, but in the end they are both about the
rise of private ordering on the Net.7
3. See Robert L. Dunne, Deterring Unauthorized Access to Computers: Controlling
Behavior in Cyberspace Through a Contract Law Paradigm, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1994).
4. Peggy Radin's article in this symposium nicely exposes the latent assumptions of the
libertarian approach to "private ordering." See Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The
Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI-KENT L. REV.
1295, 1297 (1998). Cf Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press:
Custom and Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REV. 85, 127 (1992)
("[D]ecentralized customs may be generated without legal interference and control, but legal
force may be necessary to maintain them against systematic defection."). Niva Elkin-Koren's
paper in this symposium also stresses this point. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in
Cyberspace -Rights Without Laws?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155, 1165 (1998).
Of course, the "legal authority" may not be any existing government. It might be a new
government created by common consent, or by force. Kaushik Basu tells the story of being
stopped on a road in India by brigands extorting a "road tax." This is, he says, the enforcement
of a sort of local norm. The enforcement does not come with the threat of prison, as in a tax by
a legitimate government, but it is an enforceable rule nonetheless. Kaushik Basu, The Role of
Norms and Law in Economics: An Essay on Political Economy 1-2 (1998) (working paper, on
file with author).
5. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights
Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557 (1998); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207; Trotter Hardy,
Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217.
6. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that a term
selected by vendor became part of the contract even though it was never agreed to by the buyer,
so long as it was included somewhere in the box accompanying the product); ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that contracts may be enforceable even
though they are at odds with copyright policy); Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act ("UCITA") § 208 (Feb. 1, 1999 Draft) (last modified Apr. 24, 1999) <http://
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc-frame.htm> (expanding freedom of contract in information
transactions).
7. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 4; William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the
Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203 (1998); see also Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace:
The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management", 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998). Both
Fisher and Elkin-Koren focus their attention on the trend towards legal deference to contract.
Elkin-Koren's paper is explicit in linking two types of "private ordering" on the Net: the
contractual freedom advocated by certain property rights theorists and the governance freedom
advocated by the cyberlibertarians. See Elkin-Koren, supra, at 1159.
At the conference itself, Peggy Radin found it notable that on the panel on property
1998]
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Contemporaneous with the rise of contracts as a mechanism for
Internet governance, another group of legal scholars has explored the
existence of what might be thought of as true private ordering: the
social relationships that individuals and groups form that operate
outside of the law.8 Beginning with Robert Ellickson's pathbreaking
empirical work,9 a number of law and economics scholars have
investigated these extra-legal relationships in a variety of social
settings.10 This work has unquestionably added significantly to our
understanding of how legal rules actually influence (and in some
cases, don't influence) behavior in practice.
In this article, I take a skeptical look at what appears to me to be
a confluence of these trends: the idea that law should give deference
to private norms on the Net. I suggest a number of reasons why one
theory, everyone was talking about contracts. See also Cohen, supra at II.B.2 (discussing the
theoretical rationale for this convergence); cf Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property
Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
115 (1997) (evaluating the interplay between property and contract on the Net). If the blurring
line between contract and tort causes of action is called "contorts," perhaps the property-
contract amalgamation should be called "protract." Certainly the term is evocative of the likely
effect.
8. Some refer to this as "cyberanarchy," because it does not depend on government
enforcement of property and contract rules, as does the libertarian model. See Jack L.
Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998). But in fact it seems to me
that most advocates of this position seek not so much anarchy as new governmental structures.
9. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991).
10. Prominent among these scholars are Lisa Bernstein and Robert Cooter. See Lisa
Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law]; Lisa
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Opting Out]; Lisa Bernstein,
Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59 (1993); Robert D.
Cooter, Against Legal Centrism, 81 CAL. L. REV. 417 (1993) (reviewing ELLICKSON, supra note
9) [hereinafter Cooter, Legal Centrism]; Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex
Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1643 (1996) [hereinafter Cooter, Law Merchant); Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and
the New Law Merchant. A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 215 (1994);
Robert D. Cooter, The Theory of Market Modernization of Law, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 141
(1995) [hereinafter Cooter, Market Modernization]. For other examples of work on norms in a
variety of contexts, see Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on
the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. Econ. Hist. 857 (1989); Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order
Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 390 (1994); Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745
(1996); Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 377 (1997); Richard H. McAdams, Comment: Accounting for Norms, 1997 WIS. L. REV.
625; Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 338 (1997); Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach
to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225 (1997). For more critical analyses, see David
Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: "Norms" in Contractual Relationships, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1841 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181
(1996); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996).
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might prefer public to private ordering on the Net. I want to
emphasize at the outset two things about my goals in writing this
Essay. First, I have no quarrel whatsoever with descriptive work on
norms by law and economics scholars. Anything that advances our
understanding of how people make decisions in the shadow of the law
is to be applauded. Nor do I intend to take on the body of
scholarship that identifies norms and suggests ways in which they
affect optimal legal rules. The concerns I address in this article are
only about that subset of norm theory which takes a particular
prescriptive position in favor of deference to extralegal private
ordering.1
Second, this Essay is intended as a polemic. There are good
reasons the law might defer to private ordering in particular
circumstances, or at least take it into account; I do not address all of
those reasons. Further, the problem I address here is at base one
about comparative institutional governance. 12 My analysis of that
problem is inherently incomplete, because I do not even attempt to
catalog the shortcomings of public law, or weigh the two in context to
determine which approach is more efficient. Still, I think there are
some fundamental problems that have gone unaddressed in the
headlong academic rush to reconceive Internet governance. By
emphasizing those problems, I hope to advance the discussion of how
these institutions should be compared.
I. ARGUMENTS FOR NORMS IN INTERNET LAW
The recent explorations by law and economics scholars of norms
of social behavior are well catalogued. Robert Ellickson investigated
a number of social groups that resolve disputes outside (and
sometimes in opposition to) the legal system, including cattle ranchers
in rural California and professors at academic research institutions.,3
Lisa Bernstein has contributed analyses of the business practices of
grain merchants4 and diamond merchants. 5 Robert Cooter has gone
11. Stephen Carter makes a similar distinction in his review of Richard Epstein's work on
norms in intellectual property law. See Stephen L. Carter, Custom, Adjudication, and
Petrushevsky's Watch: Some Notes From the Intellectual Property Front, 78 VA. L. REV. 129,
130-31 (1992).
12. See generally THRAINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS
(1990) (discussing the role of new institutional economics in evaluating governance structures).
13. See ELLICKSON, supra note 9.
14. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 10.
15. See Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 10.
1998]
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further afield, to Papua New Guinea, for a broader study of how
societies construct legal rules through private behavior in
circumstances in which they are not imposed externally. 16 Still other
work focuses on behavior in Silicon Valley17 or in the financial
markets."8 This work can fairly be described as the anthropology of
law-an attempt to understand how social structures and informal
rules develop in the shadow of the law.19
This empirical work on norms is at base descriptive. Ellickson,
Bernstein, and others endeavour to tell us how people behave when
confronted with a set of legal rules and practical problems. Similar
descriptive work exists on norms and the Net, though most of it is
casual and not terribly rigorous. For example, various writers have
talked about the social norms that characterize behavior of people
on-line in different venues: the use of "emoticons" to convey a rough
facsimile of what a face might; informal "rules" that govern both the
".sig" files that identify speakers and the editing of other people's
words in a discussion group; the use of "flaming" as a method of
social sanction against those who violate the norms of the Net; and
even the diversity of social groups on the Net itself.20 A number of
the papers in this symposium acknowledge these informal rules of Net
behavior, at least indirectly.21
16. See Robert D. Cooter, Inventing Market Property: The Land Courts of Papua New
Guinea, 25 L. & SOC'Y REV. 759 (1991).
17. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer, 74
OR. L. REV. 239 (1995); Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-Ups?, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 289 (1999).
18. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Fool Me Twice, Shame on Me, or How Corporate Lawyers
Learn from Experience (1998) (working paper, on file with author); Claire A. Hill, Order in the
Shadow of the Law, or How Contracts Do Things with Words 3 (1998) (working paper, on file
with author).
19. Indeed, Robert Merges was sufficiently impressed by the anthropological nature of this
work that he titled his review of Ellickson's book "Among the Tribes of Shasta County."
Robert P. Merges, Among the Tribes of Shasta County, 18 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 299 (1993)
(reviewing ELLICKSON, supra note 9).
20. See, e.g., Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual
World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 609,641-45 (1998) (evaluating the netiquette of linking and framing on
the Internet); cf. Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 311, 313
(1995) (identifying some of these Net norms and their informal enforcement mechanisms).
21. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 4, at 1160-62; Fisher, supra note 7, at 1219, 1226; Johnson
& Post, Chaos, supra note 2, at 1086-88.
Hank Perritt's paper takes a different tack-he focuses on the Net not as a source of norms
governing human behavior on-line, but as a facilitative mechanism for private ordering.
Because the Net reduces transactions costs, it may make possible social groupings and
agreements that otherwise would never have occurred. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet Is
Changing International Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997 (1998); see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Cyberspace and State Sovereignty, 3 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 155 (1997). I have no quarrel with
this view of private ordering either. It seems likely that the Net will reduce transactions costs, as
[Vol. 73:1257
THE LA W AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNET NORMS
Along with the empirical work, the law and economics of norms
includes a strong theoretical component. For the most part, what one
might loosely call the "proponents" of norms22 are attracted by their
decentralized, emergent character, which these proponents view as an
advantage over public law systems. Thus, work by Robert Cooter
(among others) has offered emergent norms as an alternative to legal
rulemaking, particularly in developing countries that lack an
established legal system.23 By contrast, others suggest that norms may
be inefficient in certain circumstances, and that the law can
appropriately try to modify or restrict private behavior in these
circumstances. 24
Some proponents have gone further, suggesting prescriptive uses
for these observations of norms in the law.2  This group of
proponents argues that the law should defer to, or at least take
account of, informal norms in establishing its rules.26 There are three
distinct types of prescriptive arguments, listed here in roughly
increasing order of strength.
The first prescriptive argument is that the law should defer to
norms in isolated cases of factfinding. For example, one might
construct a contract law whose rules regarding a transaction are
informed by the "customs" or "course of dealing" in an industry, at
Merges and others have predicted, see Merges, supra note 7, at 116, though perhaps not as much
as everyone seems to expect. See id. (noting that a number of transaction costs will still remain
on the Net); A. Michael Froomkin & J. Bradford deLong, The Next Economy, in INTERNET
PUBLISHING AND BEYOND: THE ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL INFORMATION AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (Deborah Hurley et al. eds., 1998).
22. When H.L. Mencken was asked whether he believed in infant baptism, he is reputed to
have replied "Believe in it?! Why, I've seen it done!" Similarly, it is perhaps a little odd to
speak of proponents and opponents of norms. Norms exist, and it is hard to imagine a world in
which they did not. Nonetheless, legal scholars differ significantly on the question of whether
extralegal norms themselves are good or bad, and on the question of whether and how the law
should take account of them. I speak of those who are enamoured with informal norms as an
alternative to law as "proponents" of norms.
23. See, e.g., Cooter, Market Modernization, supra note 10, at 141; Cooter, Legal Centrism,
supra note 10, at 417. On the Internet front, see Johnson & Post, Chaos, supra note 2, at 1087-
88.
24. See Lessig, supra note 10, at 2181; Posner, supra note 10, at 1728-36; Cass R. Sunstein,
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
25. For reasons I hope are obvious, I will avoid calling these approaches "normative."
26. Not all the "proponents" of norms argue that the law should enforce or take account of
them. A significant body of norm scholarship argues that norms are best dealt with by refusing
to enforce them in a court. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 10; see also David Charny,
Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1990); Edward B.
Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the Employment Relationship,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1917 (1996). In effect, these scholars endorse norms as self-interested
gifts rather than obligations: a party is under no legal obligation to comply with a norm, though
it will sometimes be in its self-interest to do so.
1998]
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least where the terms of the contract are ambiguous. 27 The Uniform
Commercial Code takes this approach to some extent. 8 To some
extent, this first approach turns courts into anthropologists -the
application of legal rules will depend on the court's ability to identify
the custom in an industry accurately. And it raises the possibility that
an industry can change the legal rule applied to it by changing its
customs. 29 Nonetheless, this use of norms in law is relatively weak,
because it uses norms only to inform the court about specific practices
within a preestablished legal framework.
A second prescriptive use of norms in law is to carve out a set of
behaviors in which courts will simply defer to private agreement in
determining what rules will govern the transaction. 0 Note that
enforcing contracts that alter the governing legal paradigm is more
deferential to private ordering than merely enforcing the terms of a
contract about, say, the price of goods. Legal deference to agreement
involves the parties changing the legal rules themselves by contract, at
least insofar as those rules apply to that particular transaction. This is
the model of the law itself as a set of default rules provided for the
convenience of private actors. There have always been circumstances
in which the law has taken this approach: some rules in certain areas
of law, notably contract law, can be changed by the agreement of the
parties to a contract.3' Alternatively, tort liability may depend on
what is "customary" or normally done in an industry. The law of
negligence generally follows this view: whether a doctor is negligent
in performing a medical procedure depends in large measure on what
27. For a useful discussion of the role of custom in the law, with particular reference to
intellectual property law, see Epstein, supra note 4, at 124-28.
28. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-202, 2-208 (1998); see also Charny, supra note 26, at 379
(arguing for judicial deference to the will of the parties rather than custom). For a discussion of
the influence of merchant norms on Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, see WILLIAM
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 302-40 (1973); Richard Danzig, A
Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 626
(1975).
29. On the problem with treating norms as exogenous, see Michael J. Madison, "Legal-
Ware": Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025 (1998).
30. Judge Easterbrook endorses this approach, for example. See Easterbrook, supra note
5. Epstein suggests a variant of this approach that would enforce norms only where "there are
repeat and reciprocal interactions between the same parties." Epstein, supra note 4, at 126.
Epstein's wise limitation seems to have been lost in the current rush to endorse private ordering.
31. See generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
CONTRACT LAW 6 (1979) ("[M]any rules of contract law are designed simply to supply contract
terms where the parties have not done so expressly. If prospective contracting parties do not
like the terms supplied by contract law, normally they are free to supplant them with their own
express terms.").
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the "reasonable and customary" thing to do is in the profession.32
Even intellectual property law sometimes defines what is legal by
reference to what is customary.33 It is not hard to imagine similar
rules on the Net. The "default rules" of copyright and contract law
could be made dependent on what people actually do, so that whether
caching or framing someone else's website was impliedly licensed
would depend on what the typical practice was.34
The idea that private ordering should be able to alter or replace
existing substantive law is clearly in the ascendancy. 5 It is the guiding
philosophy behind the proposed Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act dealing with transactions in information.3 6 It also
shows up on the Net as a particular philosophy in which contractual
freedom is primary-a philosophy Julie Cohen has accurately derided
as "Lochner in Cyberspace."37  This Lochnerian approach would
extend private ordering beyond its traditional area of control, to
permit virtually any legal rule to be altered at the will of individuals.38
Finally, a few scholars have gone even further, suggesting that
the norms of the Net can serve as a full-scale replacement for public
law.39 Johnson and Post are the most notable advocates of this strong
32. On the other hand, the law sometimes leads rather than follows in setting tort liability
standards, as it has done with strict products liability. For an argument that negligence should
be determined by reference to custom, see Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper:
The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 3,4 (1992).
33. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 1137, 1161 (1990).
34. For a discussion of the Internet norms related to framing and linking, see O'Rourke,
supra note 20, at 641-45.
35. While the primary rationale for private ordering today is the presumed efficiency of the
rules chosen, it is worth noting that this was not in fact the motivating force behind the
deference seen in contract law. See Charny, supra note 10, at 1853-54.
36. See UCC Draft Article 2B (now UCITA), July 1998 draft, Preamble at 13 <http://
www.lawlib.uh.edu/ucc2b/>. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and
Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REv. 111 (1999) (criticizing this trend).
37. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 462.
38. Notably, though, this approach almost invariably falls back on the authority of the state
to enforce these private rules as if they were public ones. Tom Bell's work is a good example of
the application of Lochner to the Net. See Bell, supra note 5. For a somewhat more nuanced
approach that still pushes strongly in the direction of deference to contractual terms, see
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright
Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479 (1995). For a trenchant criticism of
the application of Lochner to the Net, one need look no further than Fisher's and Elkin-Koren's
papers in this symposium. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 4, at 1179-99; Fisher, supra note 7, at
1219-31. If you want to look further, see also Cohen, supra note 7, at 462; Lemley, supra note 36
at 111; Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239
(1995).
39. This too is "private ordering," but it is of a different character from allowing parties to
write their own contract terms. Private ordering can occur either within the legal system or
outside it; it is the latter that is at issue here.
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prescriptive approach. They have argued in a variety of fora that
existing legal rules are not well suited to govern the Net, that
governments are not well positioned to come up with new ones, and
that by and large it may be unnecessary for territorial governments to
impose any rules on the Net. 4° While the world they envision is not in
fact one entirely free from law-they acknowledge the need for a
variety of legal rules in cyberspace 41-it is one that would take the law
"in-house," creating virtual courts and virtual governments within
cyberspace.4 2  This approach is self-consciously based on the "law
merchant" enforced in private merchant courts during the Middle
Ages.43
All of these approaches are at base about permitting private
ordering to take precedence over public law.44 Sometimes the private
ordering at issue is a traditional written contract. Other times it may
not be, as where a customary but unwritten practice acquires the
force of law, or where the law cedes control entirely to a group that
has no official government.
II. PROBLEMS WITH ENFORCING INTERNET NORMS
In this section, I suggest a number of problems with judicial
deference to Internet norms in any of these forms, but particularly
deference that would allow those norms to displace the law in whole
or in part. Some of these problems are general;45 others are specific to
the Internet. While they do not demonstrate that the law should
40. Johnson and Post's work is catalogued supra note 2. In particular, see Johnson & Post,
Rise of Law, supra note 2, at 3 ("[A] new boundary, made up of the screens and passwords that
separate the virtual world from the "real world" of atoms, emerges. This new boundary defines
a distinct cyberspace that needs new law and legal institutions of its own.... [E]stablished
territorial authorities may yet learn to defer to the self-regulatory efforts of cyberspace
participants .... ).
41. See Johnson & Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed?, supra note 2, at 66-67.
42. A variant on this approach is Bob Dunne's vision of a network of contracts, which
would be enforced by existing courts but which would allow those who manage traffic on the
Internet to establish the basic rules of behavior there. See Dunne, supra note 3, at 1.
43. See Hardy, supra note 1, at 1020-22; cf. Cooter, Law Merchant, supra note 10, at 1647-
49 (discussing the English law merchant).
44. Indeed, in Cooter's model, law develops through informal customs and norms, and
public law is justified only to the extent that it corrects "a failure in the incentive structure of
social norms." See Cooter, Law Merchant, supra note 10, at 1643-44.
45. For example, Richard Craswell has questioned whether one can even talk meaningfully
about identifiable social norms at all. See Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist?, in THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW (Jody Krauss &
Steven Walt eds., forthcoming 1999). Obviously, deference to norms presupposes an
identifiable set of such norms.
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never defer to extralegal ordering or take norms into account, taken
together these problems should offer a strong cautionary note to
those who would replace public rules with either publicly-enforced
private ones or with self-enforcing norms.
A. Norms Change Over Time
It is no accident that virtually all of the empirical work on norms
has taken place in small, close-knit communities with little change in
membership over time: cattle ranchers in a rural area, or businesses
-(like diamond merchants) that have a closed, guild-like quality.46
Norms develop most clearly and most easily in a static community.4
Unwritten rules must be internalized by those who will be bound by
them, and that takes time. Whenever people enter a new group, they
must learn the rules, often by experience. Enforcing the rules is also
easier in a static community, particularly if there is no legal force
behind the social sanctions. The members of the community must act
collectively to enforce most sanctions, requiring them to know each
other and think alike- and perhaps therefore to share a history.
They also must make the nature of the sanctions known to new
members of the community, if the sanctions are to have the desired
effect. More importantly, social sanctions like denial of reciprocal
dealing, tit-for-tat, or ostracism have their greatest impact on people
who value relations with other members of the community. It is hard
to punish a loner or a transient effectively.
No one would call the Internet a static community. Indeed, what
Internet norms have managed to develop have regularly been blown
apart by entry. As the Internet "community" has increased from less
than a million scientists to more than one hundred million people
from all walks of life,48 the rules have necessarily changed.49 Two
changes are particularly important for our purposes: the change in the
character of Netizens, and their sheer numbers.
46. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
47. See DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 12 (1990); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102
YALE L.J. 1315, 1320-21 (1993). Even in such a community, however, Eric Posner has argued
that social norms may be inefficient. See Posner, supra note 10, at 1711-25.
48. On the dramatic growth of the Internet, sources are legion. See, e.g., Katrin Schatz
Byford, Privacy in Cyberspace: Constructing a Model of Privacy for the Electronic
Communications Environment, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 38 (1998).




First, the strongest advocates of informal norms on the Net are
the old-timers, who remember a close-knit world of programmers and
hackers. Their norms reflect a spirit of openness and sharing, and a
hostility to intellectual property and exclusion; a concern with
bandwidth that may now be obsolete; and a limited vision of what the
Net is "for" that may include recreation, but generally does not
include commercial activity, and certainly not unsolicited commercial
activity.50 There is no evidence that these values are shared by the
overwhelming majority of those now on the Net. 1 Deference to these
norms may be inappropriate because the norms themselves are
simply outdated.
Second, it may simply be impossible to govern a community
above a certain size without formal rules and processes. 52  The
communities that law and economics scholars have studied have
usually been small as well as closely tied together. As the size of a
group increases, it becomes less likely that all its members share a
commonality of interest. Members may begin to feel anonymous, and
therefore to feel less social constraint on their actions. Someone may
be ashamed to transgress a moral boundary in front of people they
know, but willing to do it in front of strangers. Perhaps one might
attempt to recreate informal norms by dividing the Net into small
groups,53 though it is not at all clear that creating such groups will
50. See Merges, supra note 7, at 128-29 (noting the early Net norms that promoted free
exchange); Ira V. Heffan, Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 1487 (1997). Examples of Internet norms that were once well-established but now seem
quaint or irrelevant include:
" the idea that copyright has no role to play on the Internet, see John Perry Barlow, The
Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84;
" the idea that the use of the Internet by commercial entities (the old form) or for
commercial purposes (the slightly newer form) is unacceptable, see CLIFFORD STOLL,
SILICON SNAKE-OIL: SECOND THOUGHTS ON THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY 17-19,
101-05 (1995) (noting this stricture); and
" the idea that bandwidth is scarce, and that even text-based communication must be
narrowly circumscribed (for example, by limiting the size of your .sig file).
All of these ideas carry some currency in certain circles on the Net even today.
51. See, e.g., Allan R. Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 32
INT'L LAW. 1167, 1174 (1998).
52 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 509, 516
(1996) ("It is often said that small close-knit groups have a much better chance than large
disparate ones of governing a commons with cultural norms instead of state commands. This
would imply that early cyberspace could govern itself as a commons but that later cyberspace
probably cannot." (footnote omitted)).
53. Johnson and Post's "patching" model suggests this approach. The model in its most
developed form is presented elsewhere in this symposium. See Johnson & Post, Chaos, supra
note 2. For its early development, see Post, Anarchy, supra note 2.
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restore a sense of community,5 4 particularly when exit from the
subgroup is so easy.5 5  Or one might create special-purpose
communities that share only a single norm. This may work: many
Catholics with virtually nothing else in common nonetheless adhere
to some of the norms of the Church. But unless the group has the
history and cohesion-and hierarchical control-of the Catholic
Church, it is a long way from a special-purpose community to
effective self-governance.
The dynamic nature of the Internet "community" presents grave
difficulties for courts that want to defer to Internet norms. To what
norms shall they defer? The old "rule" that unsolicited commercial
solicitations are disallowed? Or the newer rule that seems to permit
or at least put up with them? I rather like the old rule myself, but
then I was on the Net fifteen years (and countless Net generations)
ago.56 Should courts defer to the norm that information wants to be
free, and limit the enforcement of intellectual property on the Net?
And what shall be done about practices that have developed only
recently: framing a competitor's site,57 for example, or using a
competitor's trademark in a metatag? 8 In these cases, there is
probably no recognized norm because the practice is so new. It is not
at all clear that we will find better answers to these questions by
trying to determine the "culture" of the Net than by making informed
public policy decisions. 9
I don't want to make too much of this argument. Norms can
indeed survive under changing conditions, and the law must also deal
with changing conditions.60 But in the context of the Internet, where
54. Jonathan Edelstein notes that the large and diverse nature of the Net community
makes self-governance extremely unlikely, even in enclaves. See Jonathan I. Edelstein,
Anonymity and International Law Enforcement in Cyberspace, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 231, 284-86 (1996).
55. Strictly speaking, exit is technically extremely easy from such a group. Nonetheless, the
longer one participates in a group, the more irreversible commitments she may make, and the
harder it may be to leave. These commitments may be social, or they may be economic (such as
widespread distribution of an e-mail address that the user will have to give up). On the role of
exit in Internet governance generally, see Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information
Economy, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 943 (1998).
56. This may also be a case in which a private norm is not problematic, but judicial
enforcement of the norm is, because it runs afoul of the First Amendment.
57. See Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1190 PKL (S.D.N.Y. June 6,
1997); O'Rourke, supra note 20, at 637-39 (discussing the Total News framing case).
58. See Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (1998).
59. Eric Posner notes a related problem-the fact that norms enforced by "village gossips"
are slow to change means that a norm that is economically efficient at one point in time may
persist even after circumstances have changed. See Posner, supra note 10, at 1711-13.
60. Indeed, the same dynamic nature that makes it difficult for norms to form also counsels
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change is constant and drastic, the fact that a strong set of norms
never got a real chance to develop leaves law with a significant
advantage. The law can draw on a long history, both as a system and
in the case of particular doctrines, to give it legitimacy in the face of
new challenges. Internet norms have no similar history, and they may
lack sufficient legitimacy to be effective in a changing environment.61
B. Internet Norms Won't Be Understood or Followed
Norms assume homogeneity-or at least symmetry-of interest
within the group. 62 A group with a cohesive set of interests can
punish individual members who act contrary to those interests and
still claim some legitimacy. 63 Without that consensus of interest,
though, there is nothing to distinguish norms imposed by a social
group from the rough "justice" of the vigilante (assuming the group
has the means to enforce the norms).
Even a brief look at the Net should dispel any notion that
Netizens are a homogenous group with a strong community of
interest. White supremacists,64 libertarians,6 communitarians, 66 and
communists67 all coexist on the Net; so do rich68 and poor,69 black 7° and
white,71 nerds72 and literati.73 If we brought them all together in a
room, virtual or real, it is doubtful they would reach even a rough
consensus on virtually any subject. Norms that purport to emanate
against the hasty adoption of inflexible and possibly inappropriate new statutes. See Greg Y.
Sato, Should Congress Regulate Cyberspace?, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 699, 717 (1998).
61. See Madison, supra note 29, at 1084 (arguing that in "new or nontraditional markets,"
norms may not exist, or may conflict).
62. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 9 ("Achievement of stability in a self-regulated
commons is often thought to be dependent on the degree to which the cooperators are a close-
knit, homogenous cultural group."); OSTROM, supra note 47, at 88-89, 146, 166.
63. There is a long-standing moral debate between individualists and communitarians
about the appropriateness of group sanctions for individual behavior. I have no intention of
entering that debate here. But even communitarians require some collective notion of
community to legitimate social sanctions.
64. See, e.g., http://www.kkk.com (KKK website).
65. See, e.g., http://www.lp.org (Libertarian Party website).
66. See, e.g., http://www.gwu.edu/-ccps/ (The Communitarian Network website).
67. See, e.g., http://www.hartford-hwp.com/cp-usa/ (Communist Party USA website).
68. See, e.g., http://www.pathfinder.com/fortune (Fortune Magazine website).
69. See, e.g., http://foodforthepoor.com/ (Food for the Poor website).
70. See, e.g., http://www.naacp.org (NAACP website).
71. See, e.g., http://devon.qrp.com/vadir/cryptozoology/albinos/ (visited Feb. 10, 1999).
Well, not really...
72. See, e.g., http://www.pbs.org/nerds/ (Triumph of the Nerds website).
73. See, e.g., http://www.promo.net/pg/ (Project Gutenberg website).
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from the Net as a whole are necessarily suspect, and we should rightly
ask who is behind them.7 4 True, in an exceptional case a particular
norm might be widely shared among a variety of Net communities,
but the case is so exceptional that it's hard tO think of a single
Internet norm that is uncontested.
A related problem is that these hypothetical Netizens never have
gotten together in a room-even conceptually-to sort out what they
believe and what rules they will enforce. Indeed, most people who
spend even a fair amount of time on the Net encounter only a small
group of other people.15  Social norms need not develop through
deliberative democracy, but they do need to be internalized somehow
by the community that will enforce them. This is true for norms much
more than for law, because norms derive whatever legitimacy they
possess from group endorsement. There is simply no evidence that
the majority of Netizens have ever given much thought to the
appropriate social sanction for off-topic postings, much less whether
cancelbots are the best informal response to span. 76 Some people do
worry about such things, system administrators notable among them,
but they are hardly a large or representative sample of the Net
community.
One might get around this problem by enforcing the norms not
of the Net as a whole, but of a small, close-knit community on the
Net. This is a more promising approach. Many have argued that on-
line groups such as the WELL do (or at least did) resemble the small-
town, restricted-entry communities that Ellickson and Bernstein
describe.77 Johnson and Post advocate this sort of system-different
communities within the Net will have and enforce their own sets of
values. 78
74. Accord Barbara Spillman Schweiger, Note, The Path of E-Law: Liberty, Property and
Democracy from the Colonies to the Republic of Cyberia, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
223, 291 (1998) (noting the heterogeneity on the Net today, and suggesting that it poses
problems for the enforcement of Net norms); A.M. Rutkowski, Factors Shaping Internet Self-
Governance, in COORDINATING THE INTERNET, supra note 2, at 92, 99.
75. Indeed, the Internet may actually make it easier to listen only to those who agree with
you, and to tune out dissenting voices in the marketplace of ideas. See Cass R. Sunstein, The
First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757 (1995).
76. On the use of cancelbots to target "spam"-unsolicited or off-topic commercial
messages posted to multiple locations-see infra note 129.
77. See supra notes 13-15. For discussions of the origins and development of the WELL
community, see HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 17-38 (1993); Katie Hafner, The World's Most Influential Online
Community (and It's Not A OL), WIRED, May 1997, at 98.
78. See generally Johnson & Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed?, supra note 2.
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But on-line mini-communities come with their own set of
problems. First, while it may be easier to enforce informal social
norms in a community of 100 participants on a listserv, it is much
harder to convince courts that they can or should defer to the wishes
of such communities. Courts would have to discern the customs not
just of "the Net," but of different Net communities in each case.
There are costs to doing this-not only in administrative time and
resources, but in increased risk of strategic behavior and potential
enforcement of extreme rules. Defining a community of forty million
people will, if it produces any recognizable informal rules at all,
produce rules that aren't too far removed from those endorsed by
society at large. Courts may have more moral and political difficulty
deferring to or enforcing the norms of the on-line white supremacist
community.
Second, most mini-communities are generally easy to enter and
exit-even more so than the Net itself.79 While some may remain
unchanged over time,80 it seems at least as likely that most of these
communities will have a host of new members to deal with, and a
steady exodus of older members steeped in the traditions of the
community. This makes norms harder to establish, but it creates
another problem as well: The community must find an effective way
to communicate the norms to new members before it can fairly
enforce the norms against them.81
Further, it may be much harder for a community of 100 to
effectively enforce its own norms, particularly against intrusion by
outsiders. And without some means of effective enforcement, norms
won't work at all to regulate behavior in most circumstances. To give
just one example, websites have developed a cooperative norm
governing access by Web "spiders" - bots that crawl around the Web
searching for and cataloging particular types of content. The norm
involves setting your spider to respect the wishes of the site you
access, as identified in the site's "robots.txt" file.8 2 The problem is
79. See Burk, supra note 55, at 945.
80. Internet communities in which people invest significant reputational capital, and which
remain fairly static over time, are the most likely centers for norm creation.
81. To be sure, this last problem is far from intractable. FAQs, flaming, and other newbie
sanctions may serve the goal of communicating norms to newcomers at the same time they
reinforce the norms of the community. But if a court is to enforce the norm, it must have some
criterion for deciding when the norm is in fact known by the party to be charged. And if courts
are to defer entirely to private enforcement, we may have to forego notions of due process that
are central to our legal system.
82. See A Standard for Robot Exclusion (visited Aug. 27, 1998) <http://
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that what Michael Sims calls "bad" spiders-spiders that want to
access your site for reasons you find objectionable-have no incentive
to respect this norm.83 The norm isn't technologically enforceable
given the current structure of HTTP, and it probably isn't legally
enforceable. It is "enforced" only to the extent people respect it, and
the problem is that the only ones who respect it are the ones who
aren't causing problems anyway.84
The problem of heterogeneity may be structurally embedded.
Effective norms are usually reciprocal, at least in the intermediate
run. A person is more likely to accept an informal rule (and its
particular application to her detriment) if she knows that the rule is
likely to benefit her in the not-too-distant future.85 Thus, norms often
operate among peers.86  If the society is divided into different
groups-say, one group that always sells and another group that
always buys-their desires and expectations from interaction may be
so different that informal agreement is unlikely. 7
Indeed, these groups may develop a set of assumptions about the
rules that directly contradict each other. This happens with some
frequency in intellectual property law. For example, take
"shrinkwrap licenses," standard forms placed inside a box of mass-
market software that purport to govern the contract between the
parties, which are "accepted" not by signature but by the conduct of
opening the shrinkwrapped package containing the software. 8 Until
info.webcrawler.com/mak/projects/robots/norobots.html>.
83. See Michael Sims, Spiders (was Re: Digimarc), e-mail to cyberia-I listserv, May 8, 1998.
84. See id.
85. This is why iterated prisoner's dilemma games generally have cooperative solutions,
but single or last-period games do not. See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION 11-19 (1984).
86. For example, cattle ranchers may have rules regarding stray animals, because the
problem of strays is likely to affect any of them in roughly equal probability. See ELLICKSON,
supra note 9, at 52-64. Indeed, even Ellickson's example of academic photocopying is based on
reciprocity. See id. at 260.
87. See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1089, 1123 (1998) ("Applied to the consumer mass market, however, the notion that
commercial law should be premised on market norms or conventions is deeply problematic.
Norms presuppose communities, and the above analysis of bargaining behavior in the consumer
mass market suggests that the community that drives the evolution of mass-market norms is the
community of providers."); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Are There Cracks in the Foundations of
Spontaneous Order?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 647, 652-55 (1992) (reviewing ELLICKSON, supra note
9); Kerry Lynn Macintosh, Liberty, Trade, and the Uniform Commercial Code: When Should
Default Rules Be Based on Business Practices?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1465, 1534-40 (1997).
88. For background on the development and enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses, see
Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239
(1995).
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1996, no court had held that shrinkwrap licenses were enforceable
contracts, and several courts had held to the contrary. Even today,
the majority rule is that such licenses are unenforceable. 89 Yet a 1995
survey of software licensing lawyers (that is, lawyers who generally
represent software vendors) found that roughly two-thirds of them
believed the terms of their shrinkwrap license would govern any
contract dispute.90 Is this evidence of a norm of behavior at odds with
the legal rule? Probably not, because purchasers of software
overwhelmingly believe they are buying, not licensing, the software,
and the terms of the shrinkwrap are simply not a part of the deal.91 In
short, there is no agreement between the groups on what the "norms"
of the transaction are.92 For similar examples on the Net, one might
89. For courts rejecting shrinkwrap licenses as unenforceable on various grounds, see Step-
Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software
Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988); Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D.
Utah 1997); Morgan Labs., Inc. v. Micro Data Base Sys., Inc., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1850 (N.D. Cal.
1997); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993);
Foresight Resources Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006, 1010 (D. Kan. 1989). See also L.
RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS'
RIGHTS 220 (1991) (concluding that shrinkwrap licenses were almost certainly unenforceable);
cf Microstar v. Formgen, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 1312, 1317 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (noting but not resolving
the issue), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998). These
decisions were rendered on various grounds, but a typical conclusion is that the contract was
formed when the software was exchanged for money, and that the terms of the contract do not
include a shrinkwrap license that was brought to the attention of the buyer only after the
exchange. See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 104-05.
The Seventh Circuit is the only circuit court to have enforced a shrinkwrap license. See
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.); cf Hill v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (Easterbrook, J.) (extending ProCD in a non-
shrinkwrap case), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., 1998
WL 388389 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998) (finding that a "clickwrap license" in which there was
actually assent to terms before the information was supplied was likely to be enforceable). For
further discussion, see Lemley, supra note 36, at 111.
90. See Michael Rustad & Lori E. Eisenschmidt, The Commercial Law of Internet Security,
10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 213, 318 (1995).
91. Unfortunately, the Rustad-Eisenschmidt survey did not evaluate user opinions. See id.
However, the statement in the text is consistent with everything I have heard from buyers, large
and small, and I am confident that it is accurate.
92. Lisa Bernstein suggests an alternate explanation: that onerous shrinkwrap license terms
represent a deliberate choice of an extreme legal position that reduces the vendor's legal costs
(by disclaiming all warranties and responsibilities on the part of the vendor), but that vendors
do not commonly enforce in practice. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 10, at 1790-91.
Bernstein clearly assumes that both sides to the transaction are aware not only of the terms of
the shrinkwrap license, but of the legally-unenforceable, sub rosa bargain to ignore it:
In the software market, the trade press makes it relatively easy for consumers to get
information about manufacturers' reputations for repairing their products and granting
licenses. As a consequence, both manufacturers and consumers may prefer lower-
priced software with broad disclaimers and the manufacturer's extralegal, reputation-




THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNET NORMS
look to the practice by websites of placing "cookies" on the hard
drives of users (probably a "custom" among websites, but not
necessarily one to which users have freely consented), or the practice
by search engines of selling both ranking placement and advertising
linked to keywords (again, a recent "custom," but one that is not
necessarily accepted by the people it affects).
Courts faced with such cognitive dissonance should not defer to
"industry custom" because effectively there is no custom.93 There is
no reasonable yardstick for them to use to favor sellers' norms over
buyers', or vice versa. By contrast, it may be perfectly legitimate for a
formal legal rule to resolve this situation-either by saying that terms
unilaterally introduced after the economically significant parts of the
transaction are over do not become a part of the contract, or on the
other hand by saying that parties will be bound to the terms by their
subsequent conduct even though they could not have read them when
first agreeing. The law can impose rules on unwilling and even
unknowing parties. It is more problematic for informal norms to do
SO.
The Internet might be thought to alleviate this problem to some
extent. After all, in some sense we are all publishers now, so perhaps
we have some commonality of interest. But I suspect that cognitive
dissonance remains alive and well on the Net. Maybe the groups are
not publishers and buyers, but rather commercial and noncommercial
users. However the lines are drawn, different groups certainly seem
to have different assumptions about the legitimacy of framing,
As an initial matter, even if some businesses have such a de facto agreement, it stretches
credulity to think that most consumers have entered into any such bargain. Indeed, many of
them may not be aware of the shrinkwrap license at all-and certainly not of its more arcane
terms. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150 (enforcing a mandatory arbitration clause contained in a piece
of paper placed inside a computer box, where the clause was not even part of a shrinkwrap
license and the consumer took no affirmative act to agree to the term). Second, to the extent
people are aware of onerous license terms, it seems more likely that the terms will have an in
terrorem effect on legally unsophisticated parties-convincing people that they have no right to
return or repair-than that they will serve as the basis for a mutually-understood but
unenforceable agreement that is directly contrary to the terms of the shrinkwrap license.
Importantly, Bernstein does not use her example as an argument for enforcing shrinkwrap
licenses. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 10, at 1790-91. One could just as easily
imagine a norm such as Bernstein describes in a world in which shrinkwrap licenses were not
enforceable. Indeed, that is the world that existed when she wrote her article. See Lemley,
supra note 88.
93. Glynn Lunney suggests that the appropriate way to evaluate customary trade practices
is to look at the customs of both sides, and to reject a claimed trade practice which is in fact the
practice of only one side, not the other. See Glynn Lunney, Protecting Digital Works:
Copyright or Contract 14 (1998) (working paper, on file with author).
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caching, and even linking to other people's websites. 94
Heterogeneity of interest thus creates problems for norms, and
for courts that would enforce or defer to those norms. These
problems are not limited to the identification and legitimation of the
norms. Another danger is that the norms selected may be
inefficient.95  This is particularly likely when incentives are
asymmetrically distributed in the community, as when buyers and
sellers have their own conflicting norms. The norm that results from
this conflict may represent a variety of things besides consensus:
superior bargaining power on the prevailing side, collective action
problems on the other side, or the use of strategic behavior.
Examples of this sort of pathological norm development can be
found on the Internet today. One of the few identifiable norms
associated with the Internet-the propriety of linking to someone
else's web page-is under sustained cultural attack. Large sites and
some lawyers now speak regularly about the importance of a "license
to link, '96 and about the legal dangers of "unauthorized" links. From
94. There is unfortunately no clear judicial guidance on the propriety of framing and
linking, though a number of cases are pending. The only reported decision to date on framing,
Futuredontics Inc. v. Applied Anagramics, Inc., 152 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished) does
not set out a clear precedent regarding the propriety of framing. There is one district court
decision rejecting a copyright claim based on an unauthorized link. See Bernstein v. J.C. Penney
Inc., 1998 WL 906644 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Most scholars who study the Net either conclude or
assume that linking is an acceptable practice, either on an implied license or a fair use theory,
and that framing is also acceptable in many circumstances. See, e.g., O'Rourke, supra note 20,
at 649-54, 684-86. And since the entire Internet is built on the concept of linking without prior
agreement-search engines would be impossible without such a rule, for example-one might
reasonably speak of an Internet norm that permits linking. For explorations of some more
difficult issues related to framing and linking, see I. Trotter Hardy, Computer RAM "Copies":
Hit or Myth? Historical Perspectives on Caching As a Microcosm of Current Copyright
Concerns, 22 U. DAYTON L. REv. 423 (1997).
At the same time, some companies obviously consider any link to require authorization.
Ticketmaster sued Microsoft for unauthorized linking past its front page to the interior of the
site; the parties' recent settlement means that no court has yet had the opportunity to resolve
the issue. See Bob Tedeschi, Ticketmaster and Microsoft Settle Suit on Internet Linking, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at C6; cf. Walter A. Effross, Withdrawal of the Reference: Rights, Rules,
and Remedies for Unwelcomed Web-Linking, 49 S.C. L. REv. 651, 692-93 (1998) (seeming to
accept the premise that companies ought to be entitled to prevent unauthorized links to their
sites). These companies obviously don't subscribe to the norm identified above, at least not
when it comes to incoming links to their own sites. See Madison, supra note 29, at 1084 (noting
this divergence in assumptions about the norms regarding linking).
One can easily imagine circumstances in which a frame or link causes real or perceived
injury to the linked party-many people might not appreciate a disparaging link from
www.suck.com, for example, and Disney almost certainly doesn't want porn sites referring
underage visitors to the Disney website. It does not follow from the fact of injury that one
should have a cause of action to preclude the link, however, any more than I ought to have a
cause of action to preclude disparaging but not defamatory references to this article.
95. For a generalized version of this argument, see Posner, supra note 10.
96. See, e.g., Effross, supra note 94, at 692-93.
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a legal perspective, this is nonsense. There is no legal right to prevent
linking. Not only has no court ever established such a rule, it flies in
the face of everything we know about copyright doctrine.9 But, it
may not matter. A combination of threats of suit against impecunious
defendants, self-dealing (in which sites with an interest in establishing
the necessity of a license to link enter into such licenses with each
other), and disinformation campaigns seem to be changing the norm.
There is no reason to think this change is efficient, or that courts
should defer to it. But copyright law currently seems enamored of
the private ordering idea, and on some notable occasions it has
deferred to a "norm" that was in fact merely a practice copyright
owners hoped to establish. 98 More generally, whatever "norms"
might arise from a heterogeneous community of this sort are properly
suspect.
C. Norms Do Not Adequately Account for Externalities
The legal enforcement of norms creates externalities. To the
extent that a community is not entirely closed, members of the
community can do things that have positive or negative effects on
others, and the norms of behavior will generally not account for those
effects. 99 And the Net is by no means a closed community. No one
lives in cyberspace. 1°0 People eat, sleep, work, play, pay taxes, and
pollute in the real world, even if they spend most of their time "in"
cyberspace. So it is clearly unrealistic to expect that the rules of
cyberspace can somehow take over from existing laws that regulate
97. Making this point in detail is beyond the scope of this article. For good treatments, see
Edward A. Cavazos & Coe F. Miles, Copyright on the WWW: Linking and Liability, 4 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 3 (Winter 1997) <http://www.richmond.edu/-jolt/v4i2/cavazos.html>; O'Rourke,
supra note 20, at 609.
98. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996)
(en banc); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). In both
cases, the courts adopted circular arguments that because a use could be licensed, it was no
longer a fair use and must be licensed.
99. This is a subset of the more general problem noted by Carter, that established norms
may be inefficient. See Carter, supra note 11, at 131. Even if private ordering generally evolves
towards efficiency within the system, imposing costs on others outside the system may be a very
effective way for one party to maximize its value within the system. See, e.g., Lloyd L. Weinreb,
Custom, Law, and Public Policy: The INS Case as an Example for Intellectual Property, 78 VA.
L. REV. 141, 143 (1992) (suggesting that sound private policy behind a norm will not always
constitute sound public policy).
100. See Burk, Trademark Doctrines, supra note 1, at 733; Stein, supra note 51, at 1175 &
n.33; cf Lessig, supra note 49 (agreeing with Johnson and Post that cyberspace is a place, but
arguing that it is not sufficiently independent of the real world to warrant its own legal rules).
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those real-world activities.ot
What Johnson and Post suggest is something a bit more nuanced,
though: that people's dealings on the Net ought to be governed by Net
norms rather than formal legal rules imposed from "outside" the
Net.102  Even here, though, the spillover effects are ubiquitous.
Copyright is an example. Because copying is essential for the Net to
function, °3 and many prominent Netizens have written about the
importance of allowing copying on the Net,1°4 one might postulate a
norm of free copying and distribution of works in digital form on the
Net. But there is no question that such a rule would adversely affect
(and be opposed by) numerous copyright owners, both on the Net
and off. Similarly, one can imagine Netizens injuring others by
threatening bodily harm to them, defaming them, infringing their
trademarks, or posting their trade secrets for the world to see. Other
acts, like the posting of obscenity and child pornography, and even
on-line gambling, may have less direct but still tangible effects on the
world beyond the Net. A norm that involves imposing
uncompensated costs on people outside the group who can't influence
the norm has no more legitimacy than a "norm" among bank robbers
permitting theft.105
One might try to solve this problem by limiting Net norms to
those that do not affect people off the Net. This is a severe
restriction; it means, among other things, that norms will not modify
or replace any of the legal rules governing the conduct mentioned in
the last paragraph. But, arguably, it is not severe enough to eliminate
the negative externalities. Microsoft is on the Net, for example. Does
its presence on the Net somehow mean it consents to having the
Windows 98 source code copied and distributed freely on the Net?
That seems unlikely. And if it were to happen-if a court were to
101. Johnson and Post acknowledge this problem. See Johnson & Post, And How Shall the
Net Be Governed?, supra note 2, at 67.
102. See Johnson & Post, Law and Borders, supra note 2, at 1378-81; Johnson & Post, And
How Shall the Net Be Governed?, supra note 2, at 73-81.
103. See Mark A. Lemley, Dealing With Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 547 (1997); Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 29 (1994) (both noting that virtually every act on the Net involves the making of a
copy).
104. See, e.g., Barlow, supra note 50, at 85; Esther Dyson, Intellectual Value, WIRED, July
1995, at 136, 137.
105. See Cooter, Law Merchant, supra note 10, at 1684 ("The state cannot justify enforcing a
norm that harms one community on the grounds that it arose from a consensual process in
another community."); Posner, supra note 10, at 1722.
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accept a norm or enforce an access contract'06 that required
participants on the Net to waive their legal rights in this area-I
suspect Microsoft and others like it would decide they didn't really
need to be members of this "community" after all.
A related problem concerns Johnson and Post's idea of
"patching."'17 The heterogeneity problem described above might be
solved by dividing the Net into small, homogenous sub-communities
and attempting to enforce the norms of those communities. But
doing this only exacerbates the externality problem. If one person's
actions on the Net have the potential to injure those off the Net, they
surely have even greater potential to harm those outside the
particular listservs one inhabits. Further, fragmenting the Net for the
purpose of identifying norms is likely to produce at least some
communities whose norms really do involve imposing costs on others.
Imagine a sub-community that believes in free copying, for example,
and how they would view Microsoft's claim to own the copyright in
Windows 98. To let this group freely copy the program would be to
give legal sanction to a private agreement to impose costs on others.
To do otherwise would be to say that the welfare of the broader
society must trump the norms of this particular community-which is
exactly the argument for applying public law. I suspect that courts
would (and should) choose the latter course without any hesitation.
One might mediate this tension by declaring a mandatory "meta-
norm" that groups shall do no harm outside the community. It's not
clear, though, how the enforcement of the anemic norms permitted
under such a mandatory rule would differ from what is allowed under
the current legal system. It is worth noting that the medieval "law
merchant" -frequently cited as a model for cyberspace self-
governance""8-operated only in the interstices of formal law. Where
the law merchant governed behavior, it was only because formal law
had chosen not to. Certainly there will be some analogous rules that
particular Internet communities can and will create, and that aren't
problematic simply because they really don't affect anyone outside
that community. But they will be few and far between. More
important, they are a far cry from Internet self-governance or even
judicial deference to Internet norms. As Allan Stein notes, "[n]o one
claims the National Football League is a polity because it generates
106. See Dunne, supra note 3, at 1.
107. See Johnson & Post, Chaos, supra note 2, at 1076-78.
108. See Hardy, supra note 1, at 1020-22.
1998]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
rules concerning pass interference.'" 10 9
To demonstrate that Internet self-governance (or private
contract)11 ° imposes external costs on others doesn't necessarily
resolve the question of the appropriate governance structure,
however. Johnson and Post follow the institutional economics
approach, reasoning that the right way to make this decision is to
compare governance structures to see which will best minimize
uncompensated negative externalities."' Their patching models are
an attempt to argue by analogy that the Net will self-organize in a way
that is more efficient than existing governments. Elkin-Koren's paper
deconstructs this argument at a theoretic level;1' 2 Michael Froomkin
offers a few practical challenges to the model."3 I confess that I am
skeptical that self-organization will minimize uncompensated
negative externalities in society in general, given the fact that
different groups are frequently trying to achieve different (indeed,
incompatible) goals, and given the obvious incentives for strategic
behavior. Even if I am wrong about this, though, the Internet may be
uniquely unsuited to application of this private-ordering model. I
109. Stein, supra note 51, at 1176-77.
110. The fact that contracts between two parties over the use of intellectual property rights
have significant effects on third parties is the central problem with the idea that private parties
ought to be able to set their own legal rules. Several scholars, myself among them, have offered
examples of these external effects in private contracts. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 7, at 462;
Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 93 (1997); Wendy J. Gordon, On the Economics of Copyright, Restitution, and "Fair
Use": Systemic Versus Case-by-Case Responses to Market Failure, 8 J.L. & INFO. SCI. 7 (1997);
Lemley, supra note 36, at 169-71; Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEx. L. REV. 989, 1057-58 (1997); Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining
the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997); David McGowan, Free Contracting, Fair Competition, and Draft
Article 2B: Some Reflections on Federal Competition Policy, Information Transactions, and
"Aggressive Neutrality", 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1173 (1998); Michael J. Meurer, Price
Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L.
REV. 845 (1997).
111. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 4, at 1197-99; David G. Post & David R. Johnson, The
New Civic Virtue of the Net: Lessons from Models of Complex Systems for the Governance of
Cyberspace, STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 10 (visited Sept. 19, 1998) <http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/
WorkingPapers/97_Post_1/article.htm>; see also Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering
Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1747 (1996) (noting and criticizing the focus of norms
scholarship on comparative governance); Joel P. Trachtman, Cyberspace, Sovereignty,
Jurisdiction, and Modernism 2 (1998) (working paper, on file with author) (arguing that the
choice of sovereigns in cyberspace is "a problem of institutional competence.").
112. Elkin-Koren, supra note 4, at 1187-99.
113. A. Michael Froomkin, The Empire Strikes Back, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1101 (1998).
By and large, however, Froomkin appears to conclude that the model itself is sound. See id. at
1112. By contrast, Goldsmith suggests that Johnson and Post bear the burden of persuading us
to depart from a model that has worked well in the past, and that they "have not begun to try"
to meet that burden. Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 1242.
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explain why in the next section.
D. Network Effects and Standardization Make Exclusionary Norms
Undesirable
There is a more structural problem with patching. The Internet
is a prime example of a strong actual network market."4 The
principal value of the Internet is mostly a function of the number of
people who are connected to the network, and therefore the number
of people one can reach by e-mail and the Web. Just as the value of
having a telephone increases from zero as more and more people are
added to the telephone network, so the value of being on the Internet
increases as more people get on the Net. The implication of network
effects in both markets is the same: the optimal number of both
Internets and telephone networks is one. The existence of strong
network effects in this market has a number of implications for
Internet norms.
One implication of strong network effects is that Internet
enclaves are bad-at least if those enclaves are not interconnected.
Society will not benefit from a number of separate, incompatible
Internets. The history of the Net reflects this. In the early 1990s,
being on-line meant belonging to one or more of 50,000 different
bulletin board systems ("BBSs"), or one of several large "on-line
service providers" ("OSPs") like Compuserve or America Online.
This model failed, largely because the BBSs and OSPs were exclusive
enclaves. Those, like America Online, that thrived in the 1990s did so
because they became Internet service providers -because they joined
the "winning" network in the standards competition."5 This doesn't
mean there is no room on the Net for private groups, but it does
mean that there is value to everyone in a general regime of open
access.
114. Clay Gillette argues that all norms are built on network effects, since they depend for
their efficacy upon widespread adoption. Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and
Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998). Whether or not he is correct, this sort of network effect is
not the one I am referring to. In this section, I focus on the role of strong actual network effects
such as the Internet itself. On the nature and strength of network effects, and their application
in the Internet context, see Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem,
28 CoNN. L. REV. 1041 (1996); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java Change
Everything? The Competitive Propriety of a Proprietary Standard, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 715
(1998) [hereinafter Lemley & McGowan, Java]; Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal
Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998) [hereinafter Lemley &
McGowan, Network Effects].
115. While some continue to provide their own private content as well, they appear to have
subscribers primarily because they provide access to the Internet.
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A related problem is that the most likely informal sanction for
severe misconduct-expulsion from the group, or, as Dunne suggests,
from the Net itself' 16-is likely to be socially counterproductive.
Exclusion in a strong network market not only hurts the party being
excluded; it hurts everyone else as well. This is especially true
because the difficulty of reliably establishing individual identity on
the Internet has caused the enforcers of exclusionary rules to cut off
not just particular individuals but entire institutions from the Net.
Refusing to accept data from a major Internet Service Provider
("ISP"), or even a minor university or corporation, has much greater
consequences than simply banning one individual. Of more concern,
exclusion from the Internet may be an effective threat precisely
because it involves imposing a significant cost on others. Vigilantes
may therefore use the threat of exclusion to coerce people into doing
things they otherwise wouldn't. One might look at this conduct and
say "Of course-this is just norms at work." But it creates significant
opportunities for strategic behavior by those who control the means
for exclusion. How desirable this result is depends in large part on
who does the enforcing, an issue I discuss in the next section.1 17
A second implication of strong network effects for Internet
norms is that constructing decentralized governance systems based on
a patching model may have negative social consequences. If the
optimal number of Internets is indeed one, governance of the system
itself must in the final analysis be effective at a global level. This can
be accomplished by a single body, by an international treaty, by
national cooperation or cooption, or perhaps even by informal
agreement. But the more governance structures have jurisdiction
over the Internet, the higher the coordination costs will be, and the
more likely it is that the different governing parties will fail to reach
agreement on a crucial issue.1 8
A third implication is that we ought to be concerned not only
about exclusion of individuals or groups from the network, but about
the proprietary nature of the network itself. The Net today is built on
116. See Dunne, supra note 3, at 1. To be sure, expulsion is not a unitary remedy. A variety
of punishments based around expulsion might be possible, ranging from warnings through the
killing of particular messages to the elimination of a user from the Net or even the elimination
of an entire IP domain from the Net.
117. See infra section II.E.
118. Ironically, this is an argument that will sound familiar to Johnson and Post, who say
something similar in challenging the sovereignty of existing nations over cyberspace. See
Johnson & Post, Law and Borders, supra note 2. If network effects are taken into account,
though, creating a plurality of small new jurisdictions doesn't seem to be the answer.
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an open, nonproprietary protocol called TCP/IP. Anyone who wants
can use the protocol (and therefore be "on" the Net); and anyone
who wants can write software that works with or incorporates the
protocol. But it is not too hard to imagine a future in which the
protocol-or the wires, or the implementing software-is
proprietary.119 A norm of "openness" on the Net may not turn out to
mean very much if access to the Net is itself a function of whose
software you buy. 120  Giving intellectual property ownership of the
hardware or software necessary to run (or get access to) the Net to
competing private companies won't necessarily split the Net;
sufficiently strong network effects will simply cause people to
gravitate towards a single standard over time anyway. 21 But it may
affect the cost of access to the Net, and therefore how many people
use it. It may also affect competition to improve the Net and the
software that runs on it in the next generation.
The government has taken the position that open systems are to
be preferred for electronic commerce, though it has yet to back that
position up with any concrete suggestions for how we might get
there. 22  Private ordering may help, in part; the market could
certainly tip towards an open rather than a closed standard of its own
accord. It is even possible to imagine that intellectual property itself,
which lies at the root of the threat of closed standards, might itself
give us the tools to open those standards. 123 But any efforts to
guarantee open standards on the Net will have to contend with the
established legal rules of intellectual property.
Finally, norms are built in part around existing technological
structures and constraints. In a network market, at least some of
119. Indeed, it may be much harder to imagine all of these aspects remaining open and
nonproprietary. For a detailed discussion of changes in this regard, see Lemley & McGowan,
Java, supra note 114, at 715.
The strong form of judicial deference to norms might get around this problem by refusing
to enforce intellectual property rights at all in such a case. But it is not clear that this will solve
the problem. Technological protection measures and contract law may be alternate ways of
keeping a standard proprietary.
120. See Radin, supra note 52, at 524-25.
121. See Lemley, supra note 114, at 1041.
122. See United States Department of Commerce, A Framework for Global Electronic
Commerce (visited June 11, 1999) <http://www.iitf.nist.gov/eleccomm/ecomm.htm>; Mark A.
Lemley, Standardizing Government Standard-Setting Policy for Electronic Commerce, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 745 (1999).
123. Sun Microsystems' current suit against Microsoft involves an interesting attempt to use
intellectual property law to achieve just such a result. See Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft




those structures are likely to prove quite durable. We could create a
new phone system-or a new Internet-that differs from the current
one, but we probably won't, and for good reason. The social value of
the Internet is a function of the number of people already on it;
change the structure, and you risk losing the network benefits.1 4
Norms that arise based on existing technological constraints may
therefore persist even if they become inefficient. This problem of
norm "lock-in" should give courts further pause in assuming that
deference to Internet norms is efficient.
E. Who Will Enforce the Norms, and How?
1. Net Vigilantes
A variety of technologies exist that permit users or system
administrators to block access from certain sites, or to cancel
messages to Usenet that originate from certain sites. Two such
technologies are worth further discussion. The first is the cancelbot, a
"bot" (or automated software daemon) that will cancel a particular
message posted to a Usenet newsgroup. The cancelbot works by
pretending to be a message sent by the originator of the posting to be
cancelled asking that the message be withdrawn. Usenet allows such
cancellation by the author of the original message; the cancelbot
deceives the system in order to cancel someone else's message.'25
A more dramatic form of automated exclusion is the "Usenet
Death Penalty" ("UDP"). Imposing the UDP on a service provider
will block all Usenet messages from a particular source. The UDP
does not work in automated fashion, but rather requires the
compliance of the individual system administrators who host Usenet
relays, and who comply with the UDP by agreeing not to relay
messages from the targeted source. 116 UDPs were announced in 1997
124. See Lemley & McGowan, Network Effects, supra note 114, at 479.
125. For a description of the protocols by which Usenet messages are propagated and may
be cancelled, see RFC 1036 (visited Sept. 18, 1998) <http://www.landfield.com/rfcs/
rfc1036.html>.
126. Strictly speaking, UDPs may be either active or passive. The sort of shunning
described in the text is an example of a "passive" UDP, because it requires the compliance of
individual sysadmins. Active UDP involves the affirmative cancellation of all messages
originating from a certain site. See generally Cancel Messages: Frequently Asked Questions Part
3/4 (vl.7) (last modified Sept. 16, 1998) <http://www.landfield.com/faqs/usenet/cancel-faq/
part3/>.
The UDP applies only to Usenet messages, not e-mail. For a similar approach to
unsolicited bulk commercial e-mail, see Mail Abuse Protection System Realtime Blackhole List
(last visited Sept. 16, 1998) <http://maps.vix.com/ rbl>.
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and 1998 against two large ISPs: UUNet Technologies and Netcom.
In both cases, the UDP was called because of the ISP's alleged
indifference to Usenet spam being sent through its system. 127
Because both cancelbots and the UDP are prototypical examples
of the extralegal enforcement of Internet norms, it is worth
considering how they work in some detail. A cancelbot is a message
sent out by a private party. Anyone who knows how to write one can
do so. In practice, most people don't cancel Usenet postings-their
own, or other people's. Only a small group of sysadmins on the Net
regularly employ cancelbots. But there is no technical barrier to their
use by others, as we discovered when the Church of Scientology
began canceling posts to alt.religion.scientology because it disagreed
with their content. 128 Sysadmins regularly seek to cancel spam as
well-to such an extent that some newsgroups have more traffic in
the form of spain-canceling messages than they do topical posts. 129
All of these actions are individual -there is no authority (nor even an
agreed set of rules) that decides when it is appropriate to cancel a
message.
The UDP is also privately administered-in this case by a rather
unconventional group that calls itself S.P.U.T.U.M. (SubGenius
Police Usenet Tactical Unit Mobile). 10 While a UDP, unlike a
cancelbot, requires individual administrators to "opt in," it seems
clear that even the threat of a UDP has had significant consequences
for companies like Netcom and UUNet.31 And while both Netcom
and UUNet complained vocally about the threatened imposition of
127. For a current discussion of the Netcom UDP by the people who called it, see Netcom
UDP Probation Lifted (last visited Sept. 16, 1998) <http://www.sputum.com/cns/
netcomudp.html> [hereinafter Netcom UDP Probation Lifted]; regarding the UUNet UDP, see
The UUNet UDP and S.P.U.T.UM. (last visited Sept. 16, 1998) <http://www.sputum.com/
suitsite/uunetudp.html>.
128. Scientology officials in turn accused their opponents of canceling their messages. For a
discussion of this battle, see David G. Post, New World War, REASON, April 1996, at 28,
reprinted as David G. Post, The First Internet War (last visited Jan. 21, 1999) <http://
www.cli.org/dpost/x0003_article4.html>.
129. See Hiawatha Bray, Spam watchdogs to 'Net firms: You're on your own, BOSTON
GLOBE, April 4, 1998, at Fl. The result has been that the effort to block spam has also ended
up cluttering Usenet. In an effort to promote alternative solutions, S.P.U.T.U.M. recently
called a moratorium on Usenet sparn cancel messages. For a discussion of the moratorium and
its effects, see Usenet Spare Cancel Moratorium (visited Sept. 16, 1998) <http://
www.sputum.com/cns/moratorium.html>.
130. For more on the background of this group, see Church of the SubGenius: Brain Toolkit
and Surreality Reboot (last modified May 20, 1999) <http://www.subgenius.com>.
131. See Netcom UDP Probation lifted, supra note 127 (suggesting that the UDP caused
Netcom to alter its policies towards spam).
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the UDP against their companies by a private, unelected group,132
their only effective recourse was to convince S.P.U.T.U.M. to rescind
the UDP. A similar problem bedevils other private efforts to prevent
the spread of spam through e-mail, such as the Realtime Blackhole
List ("RBL").133
Individual decisions to cancel messages or bar entire companies
from propagating messages through Usenet may well be justified.
Spam is a real problem on the Net, and both UDP and cancelbots are
ways of dealing with that problem. But it should be clear that what is
going on here is vigilantism and not consensus adoption of norms. A
small group of individuals is armed with the technical "weapons"
necessary to impose social sanctions on others. It is that group, not
the average Netizen or a consensus among users, that will define and
enforce the "norms" of behavior on the Internet. Indeed, it is not
clear what constraints the Internet community can place on those who
exercise their power to cancel messages in ways the community might
dislike, as the Scientology case demonstrates.
13 4
2. Judges
Judges might enforce Net norms in the context of litigation.
Allowing judges to enforce Net norms might actually increase the
accountability to the Net community, compared to enforcement by
vigilante groups. Judges attempt to discern and apply norms of
behavior in some other contexts, as when they look to general trade
usage to help them interpret a contract or create a remedy. But on
the Net, one may reasonably worry that judges who are not
technologically sophisticated may simply not understand the norms
they are to enforce. 35 Further, it is worth noting that judges have
significantly less flexibility than other actors in the Net community.
Judges can decide only the cases that are brought before them. In
132. See, e.g., Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Group Blocks Postings of UUNet Customers: Va. Firm
Says Internet Ad Protest is Terrorism, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1997, at C01 (quoting a UUNet
executive who called the UDP "digital terrorism," and complained that "[tihese people are not
government agents or the police. They have absolutely no right to cancel service on someone
else's infrastructure.").
133. The RBL is controlled by a single individual, Paul Vixie, and about 25% of the Internet
domains subscribe to his list, refusing to accept messages from any domain listed in the
"blackhole." Companies that have been blacklisted by RBL at various times include America
Online, Microsoft, and Netcom. See Matt Richtel, One Man Wields Power to Blacklist
'Spammers', AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 28, 1998, at C3.
134. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
135. Stephen Carter worries that judges may not be good at what he calls judicial
anthropology. See Carter, supra note 11, at 132.
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addition, judges may be unwilling to enforce norms at all if they
aren't familiar with them. Worse, they may get it wrong, creating a
new quasi-legal rule binding on the Net community. I have
significantly more confidence in the ability of judges to discern and
apply legal rules than in their ability to figure out what "the Net
community" wants. 136
Lisa Bernstein identifies another problem with judicial
enforcement of norms. If, as her investigations suggest, many
perceived "norms" in fact assume that there will be no judicial
enforcement of the trade practice, the very act of enforcing the norm
may frustrate its purpose. 13 7 More generally, to the extent that norms
are formed against the background of legal rules, modifying legal
rules to accommodate those norms may be self-defeating.
3. Embedding Enforcement in the Structure of the Internet
Code can also serve to enforce social norms. Rules of behavior
can be designed into the architecture of the Net itself, or written into
software that is used in particular cases. Indeed, a new body of
Internet scholarship suggests that the architecture of a code-based
system inherently constrains behavior. 138 If the code is written with
Net norms in mind, it can reinforce those norms-whether they be
the norms of decentralization and geographic insensitivity, as in the
present Internet, or norms of constrained access to content and the
abolition of privacy. As Larry Lessig points out, code in this sense is
not neutral; it is political.3 9
136. This is not solely because judges may not be intimately familiar with the Net. For the
reasons suggested above, it may be impossible for anyone to make such a determination with
any confidence.
137. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 10, at 1794-95.
138. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 49, at 1408; Lawrence Lessig, Constitution and Code, 27
CUMB. L. REV. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Lessig, Constitution and Code]; Lawrence Lessig, The
Constitution of Code: Limitations on Choice-Based Critiques of Cyberspace Regulation, 5
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 181 (1997) [hereinafter Lessig, Constitution of Code]; Lawrence
Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 635 (1996)
[hereinafter Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code]; Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution
in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869 (1996) [hereinafter Lessig, Reading]; Joel R. Reidenberg,
Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911 (1996); Joel R.
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through
Technology, 76 TEx. L. REV. 553 (1998) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Lex Informatica]; Joel R.
Reidenberg, Rules of the Road for Global Electronic Highways: Merging the Trade and
Technical Paradigms, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 301-04 (1993); David G. Post, Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Code: File Caching, Copyright, and Contracts Evolving in Cyberspace (1997)
(working paper, on file with author).
139. See Lessig, Constitution and Code, supra note 138, at 14; see also Reidenberg, Lex
Informatica, supra note 138, at 555. For an important effort to evaluate the political
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Once again, though, one ought to be concerned about a potential
disconnect between the people who design the code and the social
group that is presumed to create the norms. The government might
mandate code choices, as it has done with the Digital Telephony
Act,'140 or try to push them down a certain path, as it has done with its
key escrow encryption proposals. 141 In either case, recent experience
suggests Netizens might not like the results.
More subtle problems arise from private implementation of code
that constrains behavior. First, the fact that code is part of a
computer program rather than part of the structure of the Internet
itself does not mean that the code plays no role in determining
behavior. Indeed, code can directly affect market structure.
Microsoft's power in the operating systems market is a direct function
of the limited compatibility between the Windows OS and other
operating systems, combined with the network effects that drive the
operating systems market to standardization. And it is Microsoft's
code, coupled with the background legal rules that give it control over
that code, that determines the level of compatibility. 42 Similarly, a
number of the "open systems" on the Net are open only because a
unified set of code is made available to everyone. There is some
reason to think that this may change in the future. For example,
Microsoft might benefit from splitting a standard like HTML or Java
into incompatible, competing programs, because Microsoft would
likely win the ensuing competition. 43
Even where network effects are absent, and different people can
freely choose different sorts of code, it doesn't necessarily follow that
the result of this competition will be code that embodies the norms of
the community. Consider content filtering software, for example.
consequences of Internet architectural choices in a systematic way, see Lawrence Lessig & Paul
Resnick, The Architectures of Mandated Access Controls (1998) (working paper, on file with
author).
140. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108
Stat. 4279 (1994), commonly known as the "Digital Telephony Act," mandates a particular set
of technological choices that telecommunications companies must make in order to make the
digital telecommunications infrastructure open to government wiretapping. See Susan Freiwald,
Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes After the Digital Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L.
REv. 949 (1996).
141. For a discussion of the government's repeated efforts to cajole private industry into
accepting key escrow or key recovery encryption-largely by banning export of non-escrow
systems and requiring the use of escrow systems by government contractors-see A. Michael
Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143
U. PA. L. REv. 709 (1995).
142. See Lemley & McGowan, Network Effects, supra note 114.
143. For more on this point, see Lemley & McGowan, Java, supra note 114.
[Vol. 73:1257
THE LA W AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNET NORMS
There are a number of types of filtering systems available on the Net
today: the Platform for Internet Content Selection ("PICS"), which
allows people to rate their own sites by content, and allows them to
rate third-party sites as well;144 "opt-in" software, which allows for
voluntary self-rating but allows access to unrated sites; "opt-out"
software, which allows access only to self-rated sites; and a large
number of commercial rating programs, which rate third party
content for you in ways that may range from having a person read
each site to having automated filters search for "dirty words.' 1 45
These commercial rating programs may embody a wide range of
different judgments about what is appropriate material on the
Internet. Furthermore, they generally maintain their ratings list as a
trade secret, which makes it impossible to get perfect information on
how a particular program will operate or what sites it will block. 146
Filtering software poses a number of challenges for the
enforcement of Internet norms. First, there are a number of Netizens
who are opposed to the concept of Internet filtering at all-for others
as well as for themselves. 147  Second, the code in filtering software
takes on a life of its own, even for those who choose to use it.
Installing filtering software effectively delegates control over your
access to information to a computer program. The computer
program won't always tell you what it won't let you see, and may not
tell you why a particular site is restricted. And because filtering
software is decidedly imperfect, even software that tries to filter out
only what you really don't want may be both over- and under-
inclusive. Finally, and most important, the fact that a filter is imposed
"privately" does not mean that it is imposed by the person whose
access to material is restricted. Indeed, the major use of Internet
content filters is not by individuals who wish to restrict their own
144. For criticism of the PICS standard, see Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech?
CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 629 (1998). For a discussion of the constitutional
implications of filtering software in general, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, First Amendment
Intermediaries in the Age of Cyberspace, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1653, 1674-80 (1998).
145. Popular filtering programs include SurfWatch, NetNanny, and CyberSitter. For a
valuable if somewhat outdated taxonomy of Internet filtering software, see Jonathan Weinberg,
Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 453 (1997).
146. See, e.g., Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library, 24
F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998).
147. This is not necessarily as paternalistic as it sounds. To the extent that the norms of the
Net involve a culture of openness, even privately-selected technological restrictions on access
may threaten that culture. Further, free speech advocates might reasonably fear that
widespread filtering software is an invitation to government regulation of Internet content. Cf
Lessig & Resnick, supra note 139 (evaluating the consequences of filtering technology for the
facilitation of government censorship).
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access to certain sites, but by parents making decisions for their
children, or corporations, universities, schools, or libraries making
decisions for their employees, students, or patrons. In these cases,
social choices are at the very least limited and directed by the
architecture of the technology we design and implement.
Finally, the architecture of code may conflict with the rules
established by the legal system. This sort of conflict is most common
when the law demands flexibility that the code does not allow. 148 One
example involves domain name trademark disputes, where trademark
law rules permitting two owners of a mark to coexist in different
product or geographic space run into the constraints of a system that
permits only one user of a name in each top-level domain. 149  We
could change the law to give trademark owners absolute rights in a
mark, but we probably shouldn't.5 0 A more promising approach
148. As Joel Reidenberg notes, code can also work in reverse-offering flexibility that the
law doesn't allow. See Reidenberg, Lex Informatica, supra note 138, at 579-80. I don't focus too
much attention on this possibility, though, because in these circumstances law may still preclude
behavior that the code would permit, at least to the extent the government can enforce its laws.
149. For example, a number of different companies may each have legitimate rights to use
the terms "United," "Delta," "Budweiser," "Clue," or "Roadrunner" as trademarks, in different
geographic locations or to sell different types of products. In the real world, these marks
generally coexist peacefully. But on the Internet, only one company can own the united.com
domain name.
This is not the only sort of trademark domain name dispute, of course. Far more attention
has been paid to what might be called the opposite problem: the fact that the administrators of
the domain name system have allowed people to register domain names in circumstances that
violate trademark law. In these cases, trademark law generally prevails over the contrary
dictates of the technological scheme. See, e.g., Comp Examiner Agency, Inc. v. Juris, Inc., No.
96-0213, 1996 WL 376600 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1996) (granting injunction against direct
competitor); Actmedia, Inc. v. Active Media Int'l, No. 96-C3448, 1996 WL 466527 (N.D. Ill. July
17, 1996) (same); Cardservice Int'l, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Va. 1997) (same);
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Bucci, 42 USPQ2d (BNA) 1430 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 24, 1997) (enjoining anti-abortion activist from using Planned Parenthood name);
Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (enjoining Toeppen's attempt to
sell a domain name to the trademark owner as dilution, but not as trademark infringement;
reselling domain name is "commercial use"); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp.
1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (same dilution analysis); Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group,
Ltd. 40 USPQ2d (BNA) 1479 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (finding adult site dilutes famous name for
children's game); Toys 'R' Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40 USPQ2d (BNA) 1836 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(finding dilution of family of "R' Us" marks by defendant's "adultsrus" domain name); Inset
Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Conn. 1996) (stating in dictum that
use of a trademark as a domain name may cause confusion in the marketplace); see also Dan L.
Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A First Look at the Emerging Law of Cybermarks, 1
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (Apr. 10, 1995) <http://www.urich.edu/-jolt/vlil/burk.html> (discussing
various types of domain name cases); cf Digital Equipment Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F.
Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997) (granting injunction against ATI's use of "altavista" for services, even
though ATI was licensed by Digital to use altavista.com). But see Giacalone v. Network
Solutions, Inc., No. C-96 20434, 1996 WL 887734 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 1996) (enjoining
Defendant Ty, Inc. from interfering with Plaintiff's right to use "ty.com" domain name).
150. For some objections to propertizing trademarks, see Mark A. Lemley, Romantic
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might be to change the code, but in fact the technological solutions
proposed so far are rather coarse and largely insensitive to the real
problem. More to the point, technological architecture embedded
this deeply in the Net takes on a life of its own. 5'
A second example of how technology might conflict with the law
involves technological protection for copyrighted works.
Technological protection systems are an effective way to prevent
people from copying your works without permission. 5 2 From a legal
perspective, though, the problem may be that they are too effective.'53
Copyright law has always permitted some copying without the
authority of the copyright owner: under the fair use doctrine, by
libraries, to archive a computer program, and so on.154 There is no
reason to expect that technological protection systems designed for
Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEx. L. REV. 873 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE,
SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY (1996)); Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L.
REV. 519 (1993); Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a
Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433 (1994). The expansive
interpretation given the new federal dilution statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. 11 1997), by
some courts has increased the power that trademark owners have in the real world over others
who use similar marks in different areas or on different goods. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The
Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999); J. Thomas
McCarthy, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24.16[2] (4th ed. 1986).
151. See Reidenberg, Lex Informatica, supra note 138, at 582 ("The power of Lex
Informatica to embed nonderogable, public-order rules in network systems is not benign. Once
a technical rule is established at the network level, the information policy rule is both costly and
difficult to change."). For a general discussion of "path dependence"-how technological
choices may lock users into a particular path-see Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law
and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641,643-44 (1996).
152. Other types of technological systems may be less troubling. Digital watermarking, for
example, merely makes it easier to identify those who are copying a given work. It requires
reliance on legal rights to constitute an effective enforcement system. See Reidenberg, Lex
Informatica, supra note 138, at 580-81 (discussing enforcement-enabling systems).
An intermediate technology between copy-prevention and copy-identification is some sort
of metering device that is designed to collect an automated payment with each copy, use, or
viewing of a work. See Radin, supra note 52, at 521 (describing such a system); cf. Robert P.
Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights
Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996) (examining the development of mass-transactions
systems in the history of intellectual property). In theory, a metering technology might simply
identify users, or it might block uses until it registered a payment by the user. In the former
case, metering is like watermarking: it relies on a legal right for enforcement. In the latter case,
though, metering is really operating as a copy-prevention system, with the attendant concerns
described in the text.
153. For discussions of this problem, see Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A
Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996); Julie E.
Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws Designed to Protect
Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161 (1997); Lessig, Constitution and Code, supra note 138, at 9-
10. Cohen worries that anticopying technology may make infeasible the sort of free public
copying sanctioned by copyright's fair use doctrine.
154. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-120 (1994).
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the benefit of copyright owners will preserve these legal rights to
copy-much less the ability to make copies sanctioned only by
informal behavioral norms on the Net itself.155
This may be an instance of inefficiency being a virtue. When
copyright enforcement was constrained by the available technology,
copyright users had degrees of freedom that they did not need to rely
on legal rules to give them. As the technology for detecting and
preventing copying improves, those concerned with public policy
need to open a dialogue about the importance of preserving those
degrees of freedom. If we think some freedom to copy is important-
and I do-we will need to find new sources for this freedom, in the
law or elsewhere.
4. Conclusions Regarding the Enforcers of Norms
In short, there are three possible types of actors who might
enforce Internet norms: self-appointed private individuals who
determine the norms and enforce them, usually by excluding
offenders from the Net altogether; judges deferring to norms in the
particular cases in which the issues arise; or the architecture of the
Internet itself, which might simply make certain types of conduct
impossible. None of these choices is particularly palatable. Probably
the best choice is to rely on judges. Even there, it is worth noting that
by asking judges to identify and interpret Internet norms rather than
legal rules, we have placed them at an inherent disadvantage.
CONCLUSIONS
Though they take place in the context of the Internet, these
debates are not new. More than 150 years ago, Justice Story warned
against deference to informal norms at the expense of public law:
155. See Radin & Wagner, supra note 4, at 1315 ("If trusted systems are the only way to
'contract,' there will be no such thing as 'fair use' or 'efficient breach."').
Congress made this problem dramatically worse last year when it passed the Digital
Millenium Copyright Act. The DMCA makes it a crime to make or use devices designed to
circumvent technological protection systems. While there are limited defenses to the statute,
fair use is not one of them. Thus, the fact that the copy a user would have made of the work
would have been legal will not prevent them from going to jail for trying to get access to the
work in the first place. This removes the conflict between law and technology, of course, but at
a cost. Banning copy-circumvention technologies while allowing copy-protection technologies
creates a sort of "mandatory unilateral disarmament" in the technological arms race. It
exacerbates the problem of restrictions that are too effective, by ensuring that any restriction on
the use of a work gets free reign, unencumbered by technology that would permit even legally-
sanctioned copying. For discussion of a related problem, see Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the
Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998).
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I own myself no friend to the almost indiscriminate habit of late
years, of setting up particular usages or customs in almost all kinds
of business and trade, to control, vary, or annul the general
liabilities of parties under the common law .... [T]here is no small
danger in admitting such loose and inconclusive usages and
customs, often unknown to particular parties, and always liable to
great misunderstandings and misinterpretations and abuses, to
outweigh the well-known and well-settled principles of law.156
Internet scholars would do well to consider Justice Story's words.
Modern legal scholarship about norms has much to recommend
it. It represents an admirable trend in law and economics towards
developing a richer understanding of the context in which legal and
business rules operate. Understanding these norms will help the law
develop in an efficient way. It may even be the case that the law
ought to defer to established norms in certain circumstances. At the
same time, however, courts and policy-makers ought to approach
Internet norms with some caution. It is not at all clear that the
exuberance shown by some scholars over the self-governance
potential of the Net is warranted. At the very least, courts and
legislatures (to say nothing of scholars) should think long and hard
about how they will identify the norms of the Net, how widely those
norms are understood and shared, and how durable they are likely to
be. They should also give serious consideration to the policies
reflected in existing legal doctrines, and how those policies will fare in
a world governed (directly or indirectly) by norms.
This is not to say that norms will play no role in shaping the
governance structures of the Net. As Larry Lessig has repeatedly
explained, law and norms do not exist in a vacuum. Not only do they
interact with each other, they both interact with the architecture of
the space in which they reside. 157 Law, norms, and code will continue
to coexist, because while the law might influence both norms and
code, it cannot and should not eliminate them entirely. 1 8 Their
interaction is complex, and yet to be fully explored. But the private
ordering model to which I react in this article would effectively take
public law out of the equation, leaving governance to a combination
of norms and code. I think this is a bad idea.
156. The Reeside, 20 F. Cas. 458, 459 (C.C.D. Mass. 1837) (No. 11,657).
157. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 49, at 1408; Lessig, Constitution of Code, supra note 138;
Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, supra note 138; Lessig, Reading, supra note 138.
158. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96




In 1995, essentially before there were any cases in the field,
Lessig extolled the virtues of the slow, adaptive common law
development process for the Net.15 9 We now have hundreds of
reported decisions in various aspects of "Internet law" ranging from
jurisdiction to trademark law to the First Amendment. As I look at
these cases, it seems to me that Lessig's intuition was right. Whether
or not the common law naturally tends towards efficiency over time,
as some have suggested,16 it's arguably doing a pretty good job of
adapting existing law to the new and uncertain circumstances of the
Net. Perhaps before we proclaim the law to be a failure, we ought to
give it a chance to work. And certainly before we abdicate
responsibility for governance to informal social groups or to
programmers, we ought to have a much better sense than we do of
whether the world that would result is one we would want to live in.
159. Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1745 (1995).
160. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 23-27 (1st ed. 1979); George
L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65
(1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
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